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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
 
vs. 
 
RYAN MOOERS AND 
DARRON LAVEN BECKER, 
 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 20150996-SC 
 
 
Defendants/Petitioners are not 
incarcerated. 
 
Jurisdictional Statement 
 The court of appeals issued State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, on 
November 5, 2015, and it issued State v. Becker, 2015 UT App 304, 365 P.3d 173, on 
December 24, 2015.  In both cases, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  The opinions are provided in Addendum A (Mooers) and Addendum B 
(Becker).  This Court granted Petitioners Mooers’s and Becker’s petitions for writ of 
certiorari and consolidated the cases on the Court’s own motion pursuant to Rule 3(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.  The orders granting certiorari and consolidating 
the cases are provided in Addendum C.   This Court has jurisdiction to review the court 
of appeals’ jurisdictional holding pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(5). 
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Opinions Below 
 State v.  Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, and State v.  Becker, 2015 UT 
App 304, 365 P.3d 173, are provided in Addenda A and B. 
Statement of the Issue, Standard of Review, and Preservation 
 Issue: The district court in both cases ordered restitution after accepting a plea in 
abeyance.  Petitioners filed a timely appeal of the restitution order.  This Court granted 
certiorari to review the following issue: 
 “Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction over 
Petitioner’s appeal.”   
 Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness.  State v.  Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 25, 63 P.3d 650.  This Court 
also reviews jurisdictional questions for correctness.  State v.  Smith, 2014 UT 33, ¶ 9, 
344 P.3d 573. 
 Preservation: In both cases, jurisdiction was challenged for the first time in the 
Brief of Appellee in the Utah Court of Appeals.  Subject matter jurisdiction “is not 
subject to waiver and may be raised at any time, even if first raised on appeal.”  J.M.W.  
v.  T.I.Z.  (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 2011 UT 38, ¶ 25, 266 P.3d 702. 
Relevant Statutes 
 Article I, Section 12 and Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution and the 
following Utah Code sections are relevant to this appeal: 78A-4-102, 78A-4-103, 77-13-
6, 77-2a-3, 77-2a-4, 77-38a-102, 77-38a-301, 77-38a-302, and 77-38a-401.  Their text is 
provided in full in Addendum D. 
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Statement of the Case and Nature of the Proceedings 
 Petitioners in the two consolidated cases entered pleas in abeyance which required 
them to pay restitution.  Petitioner Becker pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated assault, 
a class A misdemeanor.  R:23-31.  Petitioner Mooers pleaded guilty to theft, a third 
degree felony.  R:21-27.   
 In both cases, the court subsequently held a restitution hearing and entered a 
contested order of restitution.  R:135 (Mooers); R:96:10-14 (Becker). 
 Petitioners appealed the restitution orders within the thirty-day timeframe for 
filing an appeal. R:101-02 (Mooers); R:91-92 (Becker).  The court of appeals decided 
Petitioner Mooers’s case first — it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  State v.  
Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, ¶¶ 18-19, 362 P.3d 282.  A separate panel subsequently 
dismissed Petitioner Becker’s appeal, explaining that “Mooers control[led] the outcome” 
and it had “no choice but to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.”  State v.  Becker, 2015 UT 
App 304, ¶¶ 9-10, 365 P.3d 173. 
 This Court granted and consolidated Petitioners’ petitions for certiorari review.  
Addendum C. 
Statement of Facts 
I. Facts Relating to Petitioner Mooers 
While a family was on vacation, their house was broken into through a bedroom 
window in the basement and several items were missing.  R:138:4-5, 13.  According to 
the declaration of probable cause, the thieves had “stolen approximately $3,200 of 
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jewelry and coins.”  R:2.  The basement bedroom belonged to R.R., who was eighteen 
years old.  R:138:15.  R.R. became “very withdrawn” and “wouldn’t go . . . into her 
room.”  R:138:15.  About a month later, her parents decided to install bars in the 
basement bedroom window.  R:138:16.  The family installed the bars to “give her 
security.”  R:138:16-17.  The bars and installation cost $1,100.  R:17. 
Mooers entered a plea in abeyance to theft.  R:21-27.  The plea in abeyance 
document has a section for facts describing the conduct for which he was criminally 
liable.  R:22.  That section states, “On 11/8/12, in SL County Mr. Mooers aided others in 
entering a home and taking coin and jewelry worth between 1,500 and 5,000.”  R:22.  
Mooers agreed to pay restitution.  R:24.  Under the terms of the plea in abeyance, failure 
to pay would result in “zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and a $5,000 fine.” 
R:137:5. 
The State requested $4,660.50 in restitution for costs such as the value of the 
stolen items, window repair, and carpet replacement.  R:69.  Mooers was “anxious to 
recompense [the victims] fairly” and did not dispute that these costs could be included in 
restitution.  R:128:7.  His only objection was to the $1,100 window bars “which are not a 
loss or property that’s damaged, which are not related to the crime that he pled to.”  
R:128:7.   
The district court found “that defendant has accepted responsibility for all the 
pecuniary damages arising from the break-in . . . including the installation of security 
bars” and ordered restitution in the amount of $5,760.50.  R:135.   
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The court of appeals dismissed Mooers’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning 
that a plea in abeyance is not a final order, and directed future defendants to file for 
interlocutory appeal, request extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, or possibly to seek certification under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, ¶¶ 18 & n.4, 19. 
II. Facts Relating to Petitioner Becker 
Becker entered a plea in abeyance to one count of attempted aggravated assault, a 
class A misdemeanor.  R:23-24, 25-31.  Becker admitted that he “attempted to hit his 
neighbor with the handle of a shovel during an argument regarding loose dogs.”  R:25-31.  
The plea required Becker to pay restitution.  R:23-24; 99:9-10.  The State made a motion 
for restitution, attaching for support a subrogated claim from the Utah Office for Victims 
of Crime (UOVC), which paid C.T., the victim, $663.01 for a “Medically Necessary 
Device.”  R:32-33, 35-36.  Without explanation, supporting documentation or receipts, 
the Restitution/Subrogation Notice (Notice) states that C.T. incurred expenses for a 
“Medically Necessary Device” for $39.00 and $624.01.  R:32-33; 35-36. 
Becker objected and the court held a hearing.  R:38-39, 44; 95.  Neither C.T. nor a 
representative from UOVC attended the hearing.  R:44; 95.  C.T. had been subpoenaed to 
attend the hearing and the prosecutor did not know why he was absent.  R:95:6.   
At the hearing, Becker argued that the UOVC’s Notice was insufficient 
documentation alone to support an order of restitution.  R:95:3-5.  The Notice referred 
only an unspecified “Medically Necessary Device” and lacked information about what 
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this “device” was or who provided any services to C.T.  R:95:4-5.  The prosecutor 
informed the court that he had called and left a message for C.T. and, in response, C.T. 
had faxed him a handwritten note requesting $624 in restitution for the replacement of 
glasses, $39 for a vision exam and $480 in lost wages.  R:95:5, 9.  The prosecutor 
assumed the “Medically Necessary Device” was for the vision exam and glasses because 
the amounts matched.  R:95:15.  The prosecutor argued that the handwritten note was 
sufficient for an order of restitution because UOVC paid C.T.’s claim in the amount of 
$663.01.  R:95:5-6.  None of the documentation the State relied on specified the date of 
service, provider, clinic or the reason why C.T. was seen. 
Becker argued that additional documentation was needed to support C.T.’s 
requested amount other than a note he handwrote on notebook paper and UOVC’s 
payment.  R:95:7-8.  Otherwise, “anybody could just bill out any sort of number they 
wanted on a piece of notebook paper and submit it to Crime Victims and hope that [it] 
gets paid.” R:95:8.  Becker requested the opportunity to review additional documentation 
UOVC would have relied on to pay C.T.’s claim including information regarding “which 
clinic provided the services, which doctor saw him, [and] why [he was seen].” R:95:8, 
14.   
The prosecutor contended that he was the one that had provided UOVC with 
C.T.’s handwritten note and did not believe they had “any additional information beyond 
that.” R95:9.  The judge asked the prosecutor if UOVC “would have just paid based on 
that handwritten [note]?” R:95:9.  Based on his review of the file, the prosecutor believed 
that UOVC paid C.T. based on his handwritten note along with the police report.  R:95:9. 
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Becker “strenuously object[ed]” to an order of restitution, whether UOVC paid it 
or not, that is “based on just a handwritten piece of notebook paper.” R:95:9-11.  The 
judge initially agreed with Becker, determining that UOVC’s list of payments was not 
“sufficient for [the court] to even determine whether this is directly connected to this case 
or . . . more importantly, to the criminal conduct of Mr.  Becker.”  R:95:11-12.  But the 
court ultimately agreed to continue the hearing to allow time for Becker to receive 
additional documentation.  R:95:16-20.   
Becker subpoenaed UOVC to provide “copies of claims submitted by [C.T.] and 
all documentation in support of payment,” however, UOVC did not respond and no 
additional information was provided.  R:45-46, 47-83; 96:4.  Becker filed a motion 
objecting to the imposition of restitution for the “unspecified ‘Medically Necessary 
Device,’ without further testimony or documentation from the victim or [U]OVC” and 
requested an evidentiary hearing.  R:47-83.  Because no additional information was 
provided, Becker argued that the evidence remained insufficient “for the Court to 
determine that the requested restitution is specifically based on pecuniary damage 
resulting from Mr.  Becker’s criminal conduct.” R:47.   
As with the earlier hearing, neither the victim nor any representative from UOVC 
appeared at the follow-up hearing.  R:96:4.  Becker maintained his objection to the 
State’s requested restitution amount.  R:96:5.  Although no additional evidence was 
provided to the court, the judge denied Becker’s objection concluding that while, “[i]n 
theory, what the Defense is arguing is accurate . . . what I have in front of me is sufficient 
foundation and nexus.” R:96:10.  The judge determined that because Becker pleaded 
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guilty to attempting to hit C.T. in the head he could not challenge whether that offense 
“broke [C.T.’s] glasses and required an eye examine to see if there was any injury.”  
R:96:13.  The judge concluded a sufficient nexus had been shown and Becker was 
ordered to pay restitution in the amount requested—$663.01, plus interest.  R:85; 96:14.   
The court of appeals was “bound to follow Mooers as a matter of stare decisis” 
and had “no choice but to dismiss [Becker’s appeal] for lack of jurisdiction.”  Becker, 
2015 UT App 304, ¶ 10. 
Summary of the Argument 
 The court of appeals incorrectly held that a final restitution order is not directly 
appealable in the plea in abeyance context.  Utah’s appellate courts have long treated 
restitution as separate from conviction for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.  Conviction 
and restitution have separate timeframes, separate purposes, and can involve separate 
parties.  The finality of a restitution order in the plea in abeyance context does not depend 
on the finality of the defendant’s conviction — the restitution order is final regardless of 
what happens to the plea.  But the contrary can be true: a defendant who cannot satisfy 
the court’s restitution order faces conviction and imprisonment.  For these reasons, the 
Crime Victims Restitution Act explains that a plea in abeyance is treated as a conviction.  
The legislature intended that a restitution order be separately appealable to ensure it is 
proper and that defendants are not imprisoned when they cannot pay improper restitution 
orders. 
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Argument 
I. The Court of Appeals Erred in Concluding It Lacked Jurisdiction over 
Petitioners’ Direct Appeal of Their Restitution Orders. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a defendant in a criminal 
prosecution the “right to appeal in all cases.” Utah Const. art. I, § 12. This constitutional 
provision “shows that the drafters of our constitution considered the right of appeal 
essential to a fair criminal proceeding.” State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). 
The “failure to provide a direct appeal from a criminal case implicates the guarantee of 
due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, when a defendant has 
‘been prevented in some meaningful way from proceeding’ with a first right of appeal.” 
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 26, 122 P.3d 628 (internal citation omitted).  
The court of appeals’ conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction to review a final order of 
restitution pursuant to the Crime Victims Restitution Act because it was imposed as part 
of a plea in abeyance agreement is incorrect in light of Utah case law, rules, statutes, and 
constitutional provisions.  The court’s determination that interlocutory review under rule 
5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or extraordinary relief under rule 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, provide avenues for defendants seeking to challenge erroneous 
restitution orders is incorrect and creates an unnecessary and inadequate remedy.  The 
court’s holding denies criminal defendants seeking to challenge restitution awards, 
imposed months after they have entered their pleas, the constitutional right to directly 
appeal restitution that was awarded in violation of the restitution statute’s criteria. 
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A. A Defendant Can Appeal a Final Restitution Order Independently from a Final 
Criminal Conviction. 
The Utah Court of Appeals “has appellate jurisdiction” over “appeals from the 
court of record in criminal cases” except first degree felonies, which invoke the Utah 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e); id. § 78A-3-102(3)(h). “An 
appeal may be taken from a district . . . court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over 
the appeal from all final orders and judgments.”  Utah R. App. P. 3(a).  Unlike an 
ordinary civil case, “a criminal proceeding may result in several final orders.”  State v. 
Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, ¶ 27, 224 P.3d 720; see State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶ 16, 
106 P.3d 729.  This Court explained in 1978, before the Crime Victims Restitution Act or 
the plea in abeyance statute was enacted, that it “is the sentence itself which constitutes a 
final judgment from which appellant has the right to appeal.”  State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1978).  The Court later held that “where orders for restitution remain 
open to be decided at a later date, the subsequent entry of the amount of restitution is not 
a new and final judgment for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal 
conviction.”  Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶ 17; see also State v. Hanigan, 2002 UT App 424 
(mem.) (“pending issues regarding restitution do not suspend the time for appeal”).   
This holding was based in part on the often sizeable time gap between a conviction 
and a restitution order.  Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶ 15; see Utah Code § 77-38a-302(2)(b) 
(2013) (giving the court one year from sentencing to make restitution determination); 
H.B. 404, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016) (amending the statute to eliminate the one-
year jurisdictional deadline).  As the United States Supreme Court put it, “it is not 
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surprising to find instances where a defendant has appealed from the entry of a judgment 
containing an initial sentence that includes a term of imprisonment; that same defendant 
has subsequently appealed from a later order setting forth the final amount of restitution.”  
Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 618 (2010).1 In Petitioners’ cases, the district 
courts held restitution hearings well after the thirty-day timeframe for moving to 
withdraw the plea had passed.  Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(b) (“For a plea held in abeyance, 
a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no 
contest.”); R:23-24, 85; 96; 99 (Becker’s restitution hearing held about six months after 
plea); R:15-18; 38-39; 45-46 (Mooers’s restitution hearing held about five months after 
plea).  And the restitution orders were final while the court still held the pleas in 
abeyance.  R:99:8 (Becker’s plea held for twenty-four months); R:137:5 (Mooers’s plea 
held for eighteen months). 
Restitution is on a separate timeline from conviction, and it can involve separate 
parties, as well.  A victim has standing to request restitution without the State.  State v. 
Brown, 2014 UT 48, ¶¶ 17-20, 342 P.3d 239. And the purpose of restitution is different 
from conviction and incarceration. When the Board orders restitution, “restitution is not a 
‘punishment’ but a civil penalty whose purpose is entirely remedial, i.e., to compensate 
                                                          
1 E.g., United States v. Munzio, 757 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2014) (“If a subsequent 
judgment is entered ordering restitution, the defendant may separately appeal that 
order”); State v. French, 801 P.2d 482, 483 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (“The order of 
restitution is a separately appealable order.”); People v. Denham, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 
1213-14 (2014) (“Therefore, when the trial court held a postjudgment hearing on victim 
restitution in this case, the resulting order setting the amount of victim restitution became 
an order after judgment that was appealable separately from the judgment itself.”); Sanoff 
v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 578 (Colo. 2008) (“As a separate, final judgment, however, an 
order for a specific amount of restitution is itself an appealable order.”).  
12 
 
victims for the harm caused by a defendant and whose likely intent is to spare victims the 
time, expense, and emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover their 
damages from the defendant.” Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1027 (Utah 1996). 
When the court orders restitution, the award “has a two-fold purpose. One purpose is to 
compensate the victim for pecuniary damages. The other purpose, as part of a criminal 
sanction, is to rehabilitate and deter the defendant, and others, from future illegal 
behavior.” State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶ 18, 214 P.3d 104.  Therefore, restitution 
appeals often resemble civil appeals more than criminal appeals, leaving untouched the 
conviction and prison sentence and focusing on issues of civil recovery, fair market 
value, and causation.  E.g., Brown, 2014 UT 48, ¶ 22 (holding that travel costs were not 
pecuniary damages recoverable in a civil action); State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, 353 
P.3d 179 (holding that fair market value, and not purchase price, is the measure of 
restitution for used electronics); State v. Harvell, 2009 UT App 271, ¶ 13, 220 P.3d 174 
(applying proximate cause analysis to hold that awarded restitution was “too attenuated 
both factually and temporally”).  
A restitution order is thus a separately appealable final order over which Utah’s 
appellate courts have jurisdiction, regardless of their jurisdiction to address the 
underlying merits of the criminal conviction.  E.g., State v. Birkeland, 2011 UT App 227, 
¶¶ 4-6, 258 P.3d 662 (defendant pleaded no contest and appealed only the restitution 
order).2  Restitution is “an independent component of the sentence decreed in the 
                                                          
2 See also State v. Abbott, 2000 UT App 342 (per curiam) (defendant “did not file a 
timely appeal from the conviction and sentence” but “the appeal was taken from a signed 
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judgment.”  State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see State v. 
Allen, 2000 UT App 340, ¶ 9, 15 P.3d 110 (“Utah law provides an independent legal 
basis for restitution”). 
The Utah Court of Appeals therefore erred when it determined that because it 
lacked jurisdiction to address the underlying merits of the criminal conviction, it must 
also lack jurisdiction to address the final restitution order.  Mooers, 2015 UT App 266,    
¶ 10 (“we conclude that a plea in abeyance is neither a sentence nor a final judgment, and 
therefore does not give rise to a right to appeal”).  The Mooers court reasoned that “if the 
Utah Legislature intended to create an exception to the final-judgment rule for restitution 
orders imposed as a condition in a plea in abeyance agreement, it would have done so 
explicitly, but it did not.”  Id. ¶ 15.  But the court of appeals did not need to search for an 
exception to the final-judgment rule in the Crime Victims Restitution Act because a 
restitution order is already a final judgment.  Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, ¶ 27 (“a 
criminal proceeding may result in several final orders”); Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶ 17; State 
v. McBride, 940 P.2d at 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).   
The rationale behind exercising independent jurisdiction over criminal convictions 
and criminal restitution is every bit as strong when the plea is held in abeyance until 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
minute entry that was intended to serve as the court’s final order on restitution” and the 
appellate court thus had “jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal”); State v. 
Larsen, 2009 UT App 293, ¶¶ 2-3, 221 P.3d 277 (defendant pleaded guilty and appealed 
only the restitution order);  T.W. v. State (State ex rel. T.W.), 2006 UT App 259, ¶ 6, 139 
P.3d 312 (defendant pleaded guilty and appealed only the restitution order); State v. 
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ¶¶ 1, 6, 12 P.3d 110 (defendant pleaded guilty and appealed 
the restitution process and findings); State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (defendant pleaded guilty and appealed only the restitution order). 
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successful payment of restitution.  Garner reasoned that “piecemeal appeals are not in the 
interest of judicial economy” in civil cases but “the same considerations mean little in the 
context of criminal cases” where “a criminal defendant . . . would frequently be 
disadvantaged by staying the time for an appeal until an exact amount for restitution 
could be determined.”  2005 UT 6, ¶ 16.  A defendant whose restitution order will not 
alter his criminal conviction need not wait for the restitution order to be final to appeal; 
similarly, a defendant whose conviction will not alter his restitution order need not wait 
for the conviction to be final to appeal.    
A defendant who enters a plea in abeyance, like any criminal defendant, has “more 
at stake than a civil defendant.”  Id.  Petitioners Mooers and Becker could not withdraw 
their pleas of guilty, even though they challenged the restitution orders.  State v. Gibson, 
2009 UT App 108, ¶ 16, 208 P.3d 543.  If they failed to make restitution payments, the 
court would enter their pleas and sentence them to criminal sanctions including 
incarceration.  Utah Code § 77-2a-4(1).  This is the case even if the failure to pay was not 
willful.  State v. Pantelakis, 2014 UT App 113, ¶¶ 6-7, 327 P.3d 586; State v. Wimberly, 
2013 UT App 160, ¶¶ 7-16, 305 P.3d 1072.  There is no cap on restitution, and case law 
provides examples of significant sums, as well as significant errors in the trial courts’ 
restitution orders.  See, e.g., State v. Poulsen, 2012 UT App 292, ¶ 17, 288 P.3d 601 
(“Poulsen thus walked out of a restitution hearing lasting several minutes subject to a 
civil judgment of $168,400 without ever having the opportunity to test the factual 
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underpinnings of that award.”).3  Under Mooers and Becker, a district court can award 
damages a defendant could not anticipate and imprison a defendant who cannot pay.  
Once the defendant is convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned, Utah Code § 77-2a-4(1), 
only then does he have the right to appeal the restitution order.  This defies the logic and 
holding in Garner, which set forth the separate appellate tracks for criminal restitution 
and criminal conviction so as not to “significantly delay[]” “a defendant’s right to appeal 
in criminal cases.”  2005 UT 6, ¶¶ 15-16. 
It is for this reason that the court of appeals wrote in Gibson, a plea in abeyance 
case, that a “defendant has all the due process rights inherent in [a restitution] hearing and 
also has the right to appeal the resulting determination.”  Gibson, 2009 UT App 108,       
¶ 15; see also Salt Lake City v. Ausbeck, 2011 UT App 269, ¶ 4 n.2, 274 P.3d 991 (per 
curiam) (citing Gibson and reaffirming that “an order of restitution is a separate 
appealable order.”).  The defendant in Gibson entered a plea in abeyance that, like the 
ones in Petitioners’ cases, included restitution as one of its terms.  2009 UT App 108, ¶ 3.  
Also like Petitioners, the defendant’s conviction in Gibson was not final at the time that 
                                                          
3 See also, e.g., State v. Williams, 2013 UT App 101, ¶ 10, 300 P.3d 788 (remanding 
improper restitution award of $250,000); State v. Udy, 2012 UT App 244, ¶ 2, 286 P.3d 
345 (“The State calculated that Udy owed nearly $14.7 million in restitution, an amount 
that Udy challenged.”); Gibson, 2009 UT App 108, ¶ 4 (the disputed restitution amount 
the court of appeals stated could have been independently appealed was $238,184.92); 
State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, ¶¶ 45, 48, 224 P.3d 720 (reversing and remanding a 
restitution award of $120,000); State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d 273 
(“we agree with Brown that the restitution award must be amended to remove the costs of 
Girlfriend’s relocation”); State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ¶ 5, 987 P.2d 1289 
(defendant did not admit guilt to a crime requiring restitution, but was ordered to pay 
restitution for murder).   
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the district court denied her motion to amend the restitution order.  Id. ¶¶ 4-7 (explaining 
that the restitution hearing was held in October 2004 and the defendant was not convicted 
and sentenced until sometime after June 2006).  Unlike Petitioners, however, the 
defendant in Gibson “ultimately chose not to exercise her right to appeal the district 
court’s denial of her motion to amend” the restitution order.  Id. ¶ 15.  Instead, she moved 
to withdraw her plea, “arguing that her plea was not knowing and voluntary because 
neither the total restitution amount nor the required monthly payment was fixed at the 
time of her plea.”  Id. ¶ 6.  The district court denied the motion, and the defendant 
appealed the denial of the motion to withdraw her plea.  Id. ¶ 7.   
The court of appeals held that “an otherwise knowing and voluntary plea is not 
affected by a dispute over the amount of restitution.”  Id. ¶ 10.  A guilty plea can only be 
withdrawn upon “a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.”  Utah Code 
§ 77-13-6(2)(a).  “To show that a plea was not knowing and voluntary, a defendant must 
show either that he did not in fact understand the nature of the constitutional protections 
that he was waiving by pleading guilty, or that he had such an incomplete understanding 
of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.”  State v. 
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 23, 279 P.3d 371 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Gibson’s 
holding hinged on a parallel holding that the restitution order was independently 
appealable.  2009 UT App 108, ¶ 15.  “When a defendant has any objection to ‘the 
imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a 
full hearing on the issue.’”  Id. (quoting Utah Code § 77-38a-302(4)).  “A defendant has 
all the due process rights inherent in such a hearing and also has the right to appeal the 
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resulting determination.”  Id.  Mooers disavowed this language as “dicta.” Mooers, 2015 
UT App 266, ¶ 13.  But Gibson is well reasoned and all the parties below took it at its 
word.  R:135 (the district court in Mooers’s case wrote that its restitution order “is the 
final order of the Court and no other order needs to be prepared”).  Gibson made explicit 
that restitution is final and appealable in the plea in abeyance context because otherwise 
restitution in that context would be appealed too late — because a knowing and voluntary 
plea had already been entered under Utah Code section 77-2a-4(1) — or not at all — 
because restitution had already been paid and the case dismissed under Utah Code section 
77-2a-3(2)(b).  Under Gibson, a final restitution order with the same effect “as an 
ordinary judgment” could be appealed like one.  Gibson, 2009 UT App 108, ¶ 15 n.5 
(citing Utah Code § 77-38a-401(4)). 
Criminal restitution is more serious than a civil judgment.  A defendant who 
cannot pay faces incarceration.  Utah Code § 77-2a-4(1) (the district court may enter the 
plea and sentence the defendant in the plea in abeyance context); State v. Nones, 2000 UT 
App 211, ¶ 13, 11 P.3d 709 (failure to pay restitution can be treated as contempt of court 
or result in the extension or violation of probation).  Additionally, restitution survives the 
civil eight-year statute of limitations, Utah Code § 77-38a-401(4), State v. Flygare, 2015 
UT App 188, ¶ 5, 356 P.3d 698; it survives bankruptcy, State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App 
194, ¶¶ 8-9, 163 P.3d 707; and it survives death, State v. Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 536-
37 (Utah 1993).  But it is “a legal judgment, enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure,” Utah Code § 77-38a-401(2), with “the same effect . . . as a judgment in a 
civil action.”  Id. § 77-38a-401(4).  And even a defendant in civil court has an appeal of 
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right from a final judgment.  Utah Const. art VIII, § 5 (“there shall be in all cases an 
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction 
over the case”).  If the victims in these cases had prevailed in independent civil suits, 
Petitioners Mooers and Becker would have a direct appeal of right.  The court of appeals 
erred when it held that Petitioners did not have a direct appeal in the restitution context, 
where the criminal underpinnings of the order make appellate review more urgent.   
Furthermore, the Crime Victims Restitution Act contemplates that final, 
appealable restitution orders may accompany pleas in abeyance.  It provides that in “a 
criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution.”  Utah 
Code § 77-38a-301.  “As used in this chapter: (1) ‘Conviction’ includes a: (a) judgment 
of guilt; (b) a plea of guilty; or (c) a plea of no contest.”  Utah Code § 77-38a-102(1).  
The same statute defines “[p]lea in abeyance” as “an order by a court, upon motion of the 
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the 
defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing 
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a 
plea in abeyance agreement.”  Id. § 77-38a-102(9).4  In Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, ¶ 17, 
359 P.3d 592, this Court therefore called the Crime Victims Restitution Act a “Utah 
statute[] in which a plea in abeyance is considered a conviction.”  This, too, the Mooers 
court dismissed as “dicta and . . . not binding.”  Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, ¶ 14.  But the 
                                                          
4 If the defendant complies with the terms, a court may “reduce the degree of offense” or 
“allow withdrawal of defendant’s plea and order the dismissal of the case.”  Id. § 77-2a-
3(2)(a), (b).  If he does not comply, the court may “enter judgment of conviction and 
impose sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the original plea was 
entered.”  Id. § 77-2a-4(1).  Neither result would affect the restitution order. 
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language in Meza was controlling case law from this Court, which the court of appeals 
was not free to disregard.  State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994), (“lower 
courts are obliged to follow the holding of a higher court, as well as any ‘judicial dicta’ 
that may be announced by the higher court.”); Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶¶ 20 
n.3, 25 n.4, 345 P.3d 553.  Like the court of appeals in Gibson, this Court in Meza 
understood that the legislature intended to treat the restitution order accompanying a plea 
in abeyance the way it would treat the restitution order accompanying a conviction.  
Meza, 2015 UT 70, ¶ 17.   
In summary, a restitution order is a separate appealable order.  This result follows 
naturally where the legislature has put the two on separate timeframes.  Utah Code § 77-
38a-302(2)(b) (Supp.2016) (eliminating language codifying a jurisdictional deadline for 
restitution one year after sentencing and allowing even longer); id. § 77-38a-102(9) 
(Crime Victims Restitution Act explaining pleas can be held in abeyance).  The court of 
appeals erred when it searched the Crime Victims Restitution Act for an explicit right of 
appeal instead of following the sound guidance of Gibson and Meza.  Mooers, 2015 UT 
App 266, ¶¶ 13-14.     
B. Alternate Methods of Review Are a Poor Fit. 
The court of appeals held that, instead of a direct appeal, a defendant in a plea in 
abeyance case could request interlocutory review of the restitution order under rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, request extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or possibly seek certification under rule 54(b) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure.  State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, ¶ 18 & n.4.  These 
methods are unnecessary, see supra Part I, inadequate, and they are a poor fit for a final 
restitution order. 
Interlocutory review is for interlocutory orders.  Utah R. App. P. 5(a).  As argued 
above, a restitution order is a final order.  And because it is final, discretionary review is 
insufficient — if it were not granted, review would come either too late or not at all.  
Petitioning for review of an interlocutory order creates additional delay and wastes 
resources while the parties brief the petition and wait for a decision on whether the court 
of appeals will hear the case.  Utah R. App. P. 5(a), (g).  The process is designed to 
“materially advance the termination of the litigation,” Utah R. App. P. 5(c)(1)(D), but 
because the restitution order is independent of the conviction, an interlocutory appeal will 
not speed up the ultimate disposition of the case.  And a defendant who cannot convince 
the court “why the appeal may materially advance the termination of the litigation” is 
unlikely to convince the court to grant the requested permission to appeal.  Id. 
Extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
likewise problematic.  First, the burden of convincing the court to exercise its 
discretionary authority to grant relief is on the defendant. “Unlike a party filing a direct 
appeal, a petitioner seeking rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief has no right to receive a 
remedy that corrects a lower court’s mishandling of a particular case. . . Because a party 
petitioning for rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief is not entitled to receive relief, even if that 
party successfully establishes that a lower court abused its discretion, such relief will be, 
naturally, more difficult to obtain.”  State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 23, 127 P.3d 682 
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(“[W]hether relief is ultimately granted is left to the sound discretion of the court hearing 
the petition.”).  
“Indeed, in a particular case, relief may very well be available under the terms of 
rule 65B(d) itself — which states that a petitioner has established adequate grounds for 
relief upon showing that a lower court ‘abused its discretion,’ Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(d)(2)(A)—but a court may nevertheless withhold relief.” Id. ¶ 24. This Court 
compared the “exercise of the court’s discretion when deciding whether to grant rule 
65B(d) extraordinary relief” to its discretion when deciding whether to grant a writ of 
certiorari. Id. Incorrect restitution awards are critical to defendants who will be convicted 
if they fail to pay them, but defendants will face an uphill battle convincing the court that 
the common legal errors that occur in restitution hearings are egregious, significant, and 
severe enough to merit extraordinary relief. See id.  
Next, appellate courts “will issue an extraordinary writ only when ‘no other plain, 
speedy[,] and adequate remedy is available.’”  Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, ¶ 21, 359 P.3d 
592 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)).  As Meza noted, “extraordinary relief is not 
available [if the defendant] has another remedy available for challenging his plea in 
abeyance.”  Id. ¶ 22 (directing defendants who wish to challenge dismissed pleas in 
abeyance to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)).  And as argued above, a direct 
appeal has ordinarily been available to defendants who wish to challenge restitution 
orders.  See, supra, Part I n.2.  
Finally, the court of appeals suggested that seeking review under rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure “may not be available in a criminal case.  But even if it is, 


ADDENDUM A












ADDENDUM B







ADDENDUM C 








ADDENDUM D 
Utah Const. art. I, § 12 
 
Article I, Section 12.   [Rights of accused persons.] 
     In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
     Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function 
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless 
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule.  
 
Utah Const. art. VIII, § 5 
 
Sec. 5. [District courts, how constituted. Terms. Jurisdiction. Judge pro tempore.] 
The State shall be divided into seven judicial districts, for each of which, at least one, and 
not exceeding three judges, shall be chosen by the qualified electors thereof. The term of 
office of the district judges shall be four years. Except that the District Judges elected at 
the first election shall serve until the first Monday in January, AD 1901, and until their 
successors shall have qualified. Until otherwise provided by law, a district court at the 
county seat of each county shall be held at least four times a year. All civil and criminal 
business arising in any county, must be tried in such county, unless a change of venue be 
taken, in such cases as may be provided by law. Each judge of a District Court shall be at 
least twenty-five years of age, a member of the bar, learned in the law, a resident of the 
Territory or State of Utah three years next preceding his election, and shall reside in the 
district for which he shall be elected. Any District Judge may hold a District Court in any 
county at the request of the judge of the district, and upon a request of the Governor, it 
shall be his duty to do so. Any cause in the District Court may be tried by a judge pro 
tempore, who must be a member of the bar, sworn to try the cause, and agreed upon by 
the parties, or their attorneys of record. 
  
 
 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78A-4-102 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-2a-2 
§ 78A-4-102. Number of judges--Terms--Functions--Filing fees 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment to office as a judge of 
the Court of Appeals is until the first general election held more than three years after the effective 
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six 
years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge 
whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional 
compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction thereof for the period served. 
  
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to 
panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by 
rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en 
banc. 
  
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of 
the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is two years and 
until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no 
more than two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting presiding 
judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
  
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by majority vote of all 
judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the 
presiding judge shall: 
  
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
  
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
  
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
  
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council.  
 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme Court. 
  
Credits 
 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 349, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
  
  
U.C.A. 1953 § 78A-4-103 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-2a-3 
§ 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and 
process necessary: 
  
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
  
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
  
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
  
(a)(i) a final order or decree resulting from: 
  
(A) a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency; or 
  
(B) a special adjudicative proceeding, as described in Section 19-1-301.5; or 
  
(ii) an appeal from the district court review of an informal adjudicative proceeding of an 
agency other than the following: 
  
(A) the Public Service Commission; 
  
(B) the State Tax Commission; 
  
(C) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
  
(D) the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, for an action reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources; 
  
(E) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
  
(F) the state engineer; 
  
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
  
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
  
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
  
  
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
  
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
  
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or 
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
 
  (f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a 
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
  
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
  
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, 
and paternity; 
  
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
 
 (j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
  
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may 
certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over 
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
  
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
  
Credits 
 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 350, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2210, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, 
c. 344, § 42, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2012, c. 333, § 6, eff. May 8, 2012; Laws 2015, c. 441, § 7, 
eff. May 12, 2015. 
  
  
 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-13-6 
§ 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea 
 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
  
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing 
that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
  
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall 
be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the 
motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made 
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
  
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) 
shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
  
 
Credits 
 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 16, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 1, eff. 
May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 90, § 91, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 251, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
  
 
  
 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-2a-3 
§ 77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea--Powers of court 
 
 
(1)(a) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement shall be done in full 
compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
  
(b) In cases charging offenses for which bail may be forfeited, a plea in abeyance agreement 
may be entered into without a personal appearance before a magistrate. 
  
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon finding that the defendant 
has successfully completed the terms of the agreement: 
  
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence for a 
lower degree of offense; or 
  
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant’s plea and order the dismissal of the case. 
  
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a plea in abeyance 
agreement, the court may reduce the degree of the offense or dismiss the case only as provided in 
the plea in abeyance agreement or as agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any 
lesser offense pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke Section 
76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense. 
  
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the administration of the plea 
in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on probation to the court under Section 77-18-1. 
  
(5) The terms of a plea in abeyance agreement may include: 
  
(a) an order that the defendant pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee, with a surcharge based 
on the amount of the plea in abeyance fee, both of which shall be allocated in the same manner 
as if paid as a fine for a criminal conviction under Section 78A-5-110 and a surcharge under 
Title 51, Chapter 9, Part 4, Criminal Conviction Surcharge Allocation, and which may not 
exceed in amount the maximum fine and surcharge which could have been imposed upon 
conviction and sentencing for the same offense; 
  
(b) an order that the defendant pay restitution to the victims of the defendant’s actions as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
  
(c) an order that the defendant pay the costs of any remedial or rehabilitative program required 
by the terms of the agreement; and 
  
  
(d) an order that the defendant comply with any other conditions which could have been 
imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense. 
  
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the prosecuting attorney 
and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney not to agree to a plea in abeyance is final. 
  
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense against a victim who is 
under the age of 14. 
  
(8) Beginning on July 1, 2008, no plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a driving 
under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-502. 
  
Credits 
 
Laws 1993, c. 82, § 5; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 5, eff. May 6, 
2002; Laws 2004, c. 203, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2004, c. 228, § 7, eff. July 1, 2006; Laws 
2006, c. 341, § 9, eff. July 1, 2006; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 247, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 339, § 
27, eff. July 1, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2191, eff. May 5, 2008. 
  
  
 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-2a-4 
§ 77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement--Hearing--Entry of judgment and 
imposition of sentence--Subsequent prosecutions 
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, information comes to the 
attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant has violated any condition of 
the agreement, the court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion 
and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear before 
the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the terms of 
the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be terminated. If, 
following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially 
comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the 
agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the 
offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and 
imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to 
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court. 
  
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry of judgment of 
conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent prosecution arising from any 
offense that constituted a violation of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original 
plea was placed in abeyance. 
  
 
Credits 
 
Laws 1993, c. 82, § 6. 
  
  
 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-102 
§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
 
As used in this chapter: 
  
(1) “Conviction” includes a: 
  
(a) judgment of guilt; 
  
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
  
(c) a plea of no contest. 
  
(2) “Criminal activities” means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
  
(3) “Department” means the Department of Corrections. 
 
(4) “Diversion” means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition that a 
defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the victim, or fulfill 
some other condition. 
  
(5) “Party” means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
  
(6) “Pecuniary damages” means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, 
which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant’s criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but 
excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
  
(7) “Plea agreement” means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant setting 
forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant will enter a 
plea of guilty or no contest. 
  
(8) “Plea disposition” means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and defendant 
including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement by which the 
defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
  
 
(9) “Plea in abeyance” means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
  
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he 
comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
  
(10) “Plea in abeyance agreement” means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following acceptance of 
the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
  
(11) “Restitution” means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured 
damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental 
entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
  
(12)(a) “Reward” means a sum of money: 
  
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an offender; 
and 
  
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that the 
person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
  
(b) “Reward” does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the public. 
  
(13) “Screening” means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative 
action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or 
cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
  
(14)(a) “Victim” means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for Victims of Crime, who 
the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal 
activities. 
  
(b) “Victim” may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
  
 
Credits 
 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, 
c. 96, § 3, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2015, c. 147, § 4, eff. May 12, 2015. 
  
 
  
 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-301 
§ 77-38a-301. Restitution--Convicted defendant may be required to pay 
 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution. 
  
 
Credits 
 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 7, eff. April 30, 2001. 
  
 
 
  
 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution 
is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) 
through (5). 
  
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution. 
  
(a) “Complete restitution” means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by the defendant. 
  
(b) “Court-ordered restitution” means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction 
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within 
one year after sentencing. 
 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
  
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the court 
shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
  
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
  
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant 
agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a 
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
  
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
  
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
  
  
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to 
physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
  
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
  
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily 
injury to a victim; 
  
(v) up to five days of the individual victim’s determinable wages that are lost due to theft of 
or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were 
essential to the victim’s current employment at the time of the offense; and 
  
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
  
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the 
court shall consider: 
  
(i) the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b); 
  
(ii) the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial declaration 
described in Section 77-38a-204; 
  
(iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of 
the defendant; 
  
(iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
  
(v) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
  
(vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. 
  
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete restitution 
and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of sentencing if 
feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
  
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year after 
sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
  
 
 
  
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an order of 
judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
  
Credits 
 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, 
c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. 
May 2, 2005; Laws 2013, c. 74, § 10, eff. May 14, 2013. 
  
  
 
 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-401 
§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment--Interest--Civil actions--Lien 
 
 
 
(1) Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter 
an order of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and 
provide notice of the order to the parties. 
  
(2) The order shall be considered a legal judgment, enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, the department may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution 
order is entered, enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
  
(3) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or 
department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to 
recover collection and reasonable attorney fees. 
  
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection 77-18-6(1)(b)(v) and Sections 78B-2-311 and 78B-5-202, a 
judgment ordering restitution when entered on the civil judgment docket shall have the same 
affect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment in a civil action and expires only upon 
payment in full, which includes applicable interest, collection fees, and attorney fees. Interest 
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing, including prejudgment interest. 
This Subsection (4) applies to all restitution judgments not paid in full on or before May 12, 2009. 
  
(5) The department shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to principal 
first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
  
Credits 
 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 9, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2208, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 
2009, c. 111, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2011, c. 37, § 1, eff. May 10, 2011. 
  
